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Habeas Corpus, Alternative Remedies,
and the Myth of Swain v. Pressley
Stephen I. Vladeck*
I. INTRODUCTION
The current debate over judicial review of the detention of
"enemy combatants" is dominated by the question of whether the
Constitution's Suspension ClauseI applies to non-citizens detained
outside the territorial United States, including those held at
Guant~namo Bay, Cuba.2 But an equally important question is
lurking just beneath the surface in Boumediene v. Bush, the lead
case currently3 before the Supreme Court: If the Suspension
* Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. This
essay was prepared in conjunction with the Roger Williams University School
of Law's November 2007 Symposium, "Legal Dilemmas in a Dangerous
World: Law, Terrorism, and National Security," for my participation in which
I owe thanks to Peter Margulies. Thanks also to Emily Pasternak for
research assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it.").
2. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196). For two differing
academic takes on the question, compare J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and
Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007), with
Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 275 (2008). See generally Paul Halliday & G. Edward White,
The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Context, and American
Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575 (2008).
3. As this article went to print, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Boumediene, holding that the Suspension Clause does apply to the
Guantdnamo detainees, and that the substitute for habeas corpus provided
by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions Act of
2006 is an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus. See Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). For Justice Kennedy's analysis of the latter issue, see
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Clause does protect the right to habeas corpus for non-citizens
held abroad (or at least at Guantfnamo),4 is the jurisdiction-
stripping provision of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA)5 actually inconsistent therewith?
The prevailing assumption is that this question necessarily
reduces to whether the MCA, along with the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 (DTA),6 provides an "adequate" and "effective"
substitute for the remedy provided by the writ of habeas corpus.
And the reason why that appears to be the ultimate question is
the Supreme Court's oft-cited-but seldom read-1977 decision in
Swain v. Pressley (Pressley).7 Pressley, a case arising indirectly out
of the 1970 reorganization of the D.C. judicial system, is
commonly invoked for the proposition that the Suspension Clause
is not implicated unless the relevant remedial scheme provides no
adequate or effective substitute for habeas corpus.8
As significant as Pressley figures in current debates, very
id. at 2262-74, unquestionably merits a discussion that is simply not possible
here. For now, though, it suffices to note the Boumediene majority's
conclusion that "[t]he present cases.., test the limits of the Suspension
Clause in ways that Hayman and Swain did not," id. at 2266, for many of the
same reasons articulated in more detail herein.
4. Indeed, much of the focus of the current litigation is whether
Guantdnamo is "different," i.e., whether there is a colorable argument that
non-citizens held in Cuba might have a stronger claim to constitutional
protections, including those enmeshed with the Suspension Clause, than
those held elsewhere outside the United States. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 485-88 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Gherebi v.
Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1285-99 (9th Cir. 2003).
5. Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (2006) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)) ("No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by
the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or
is awaiting such determination.").
6. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005).
7. 430 U.S. 372 (1977). Although the case is usually referred to in
shorthand as "Swain," the habeas petitioner was Jasper Pressley, and so I
refer to the case as Pressley throughout this essay.
8. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314 n.38 (2001) (citing
Pressley for the proposition that "Congress could, without raising any
constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through the courts
of appeals"); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1480 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
126 S. Ct. 2749, 2818 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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little has been written about the case itself, or the rule for which it
has since become the standard citation. 9 Thus, in attempting to
analyze whether the remedy provided by the MCA and DTA to
detained "enemy combatants" comports with the Suspension
Clause, courts and commentators have little precedent or
academic discussion to guide them. The animating purpose of this
symposium essay, then, is to reconstruct the Court's decision in
Pressley so as to understand the implications of its holding, and its
potential relevance both to the current Guantdnamo cases and to
other recent legislative attempts to provide a substitute remedy
for habeas corpus.
To reconstruct Pressley, Part II begins with the Supreme
Court's 1952 decision in United States v. Hayman.10 In Hayman,
the Court vacated a Ninth Circuit decision that had invalidated 28
U.S.C. § 2255, one of Congress's first attempts to provide a
statutory alternative to habeas corpus. The Court's unanimous
decision in Hayman nevertheless reserved any question as to the
constitutional implications of such legislation. Thus, when the
Pressley Court considered a statute modeled on § 2255-section
23-110(g) of the D.C. Code-it was resolving a question of first
impression.
As Part II concludes, Pressley did not go much further than
Hayman had, holding only that there is no constitutional defect
with a statute that provides an "adequate" and "effective" means
of challenging detention other than habeas corpus. Pointedly, the
Court in Pressley did not decide whether "inadequate" or
"ineffective" remedies were necessarily unconstitutional, leaving
that question open for later courts.
In Part III, I turn to Pressley's aftermath, and briefly survey
those contexts wherein Swain v. Pressley has figured prominently
since it was decided. Part III therefore begins with the Supreme
9. Even recent academic discussions of the "adequate" and "effective"
substitute issue have given short shrift to Pressley itself. See, e.g.,
Christopher J. Schatz & Noah A.F. Horst, Will Justice Delayed Be Justice
Denied? Crisis Jurisprudence, the Guantdnamo Detainees, and the Imperiled
Role of Habeas Corpus in Curbing Abusive Government Detention, 11 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 539 (2007).
10. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
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Court's 1996 decision in Felker v. Turpin,11 in which the Court
upheld the so-called "gatekeeper" provisions of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)12 on the ground
that an alternative remedy remained available. Part III next
turns to the context of immigration law, where AEDPA, and later
the REAL ID Act of 2005,13 attempted to preclude immigration
habeas petitions in favor of direct review of administrative
decisions. Finally, Part III concludes with the application of Swain
v. Pressley to the current cases arising out of Guantdnamo, and
the question whether the review provided by the DTA and the
MCA constitutes an "adequate" and "effective" substitute for
habeas corpus.
Given that the Supreme Court is due to decide Boumediene
later this year, and will quite likely reach the question of whether
the DTA and MCA provide an "adequate" alternative to habeas
corpus, Part III assiduously avoids handicapping the merits of this
question. Instead, in Part IV, I turn to the "myth" of Swain v.
Pressley-the extent to which the "rule" Pressley enunciates might
actually serve to distort courts' review of the adequacy of
alternative remedies to habeas corpus. Because of this effect, Part
IV suggests several reasons why Pressley is not nearly as helpful
in defining the limits of Congress's power to fashion alternative
remedies to habeas corpus as is generally suggested. Whatever the
Court ultimately holds in Boumediene, any discussion of the
constitutional adequacy of the alternative remedy will, in reality,
resolve a question of first impression.
II. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES: FROM HAYMAN TO PRESSLEY
Arguably, the first time Congress ever provided a statutory
substitute for the writ of habeas corpus was in the Judiciary Act of
1789, section 14 of which created a federal statutory cause of
action by the same name:
That all the before-mentioned courts of the United States,
shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas
11. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
13. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302-23 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by
statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles
and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the
supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts,
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment.
Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case
extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in
custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United
States, or are committed for trial before some court of the
same, or are necessary to be brought into court to
testify. 
14
As Chief Justice Marshall would explain less than two
decades later, although federal courts could resort to the common
law for the "meaning" of "habeas corpus," they were only
empowered to exercise that jurisdiction conferred by statute. 15
Thus, at least in the federal courts, the federal "statutory" writ
became a complete substitute for the "common-law" (or what is
sometimes referred to as the "constitutional") writ of habeas
corpus. 16
Notwithstanding Bollman's elimination of common-law
habeas in the federal courts, questions about the substantive
sufficiency of the federal statutory writ did not arise until well
into the twentieth century. 17 Thus, Part II begins with Congress's
first attempt to provide a substitute remedy for the statutory writ
of habeas corpus, before moving onto Swain v. Pressley and its
implications.
14. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000)).
15. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
16. On the constitutional origins of habeas corpus, see generally
WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980); and
Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605
(1970).
17. For a discussion of why Bollman's preclusion of federal common-law
habeas did not raise more serious Suspension Clause problems, see Vladeck,
supra note 2.
2008]
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A. Hayman and 28 U.S.C. § 2255
Perhaps ironically, the Supreme Court itself was largely
responsible for the first concerted effort on Congress's part to
provide a substitute remedy for the federal statutory writ of
habeas corpus. At the heart of the problem were a series of
decisions during the 1940s that seemingly opened the door to
potential abuses of the writ by prisoners.
In Waley v. Johnston, for example, the Court for the first time
allowed federal prisoners to contest their convictions even where
the trial record itself was unassailable-a holding that necessarily
contemplated review of facts dehors the record. 18 In Walker v.
Johnston, the Court held that in certain circumstances, habeas
petitioners were entitled to a full evidentiary hearing in the
habeas court.1 9 And in Ahrens v. Clark, the Court concluded that
habeas petitions must be filed in the district of the prisoner's
confinement. 20
Taken together, Ahrens, Waley, and Walker created a
logistical nightmare; at the time, most federal prisoners were held
somewhere other than the district in which they were convicted.
Between 1942 and 1948, for example, 63% of federal prisoners
were held in just five districts. 21 Thus, district courts considering
(the growing number of) post-conviction habeas petitions brought
by federal prisoners were beset by serious administrative
problems, including the routine unavailability of the trial court
record and of key witnesses.
22
In response to the problems posed by these decisions
(combined with growing abuse of the writ by federal prisoners
unintentionally emboldened by them), the Judicial Conference of
the United States proposed legislation to create a statutory
remedy for those in custody pursuant to a federal conviction. Such
18. 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (per curiam).
19. 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
20. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
21. See William H. Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 OHIO
ST. L.J. 337 (1949). In Hayman, the Court relied heavily upon Speck's article.
See, e.g., United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 n.14, 214 n.18 (1952).
22. For an overview of the problems motivating § 2255, see John J.
Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949); Louis E.
Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1948).
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a motion for post-conviction relief would be filed in the district of
conviction and sentence, rather than in the district of
confinement. 23 Although there was little movement on the
proposal between 1942 and 1948,24 Ahrens apparently rekindled
the momentum for such a measure, so that when the Judicial
Code was re-codified in June 1948, it included new 28 U.S.C. §
2255.25
Critically, while creating a statutory post-conviction remedy
in the district of conviction, § 2255 also precluded post-conviction
habeas corpus in the district of confinement:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion
pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it
appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief,
by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such
court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that
the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of his detention. 26
Thus, for the first time, Congress displaced the statutory writ
of habeas corpus unless "the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of [the petitioner's] detention." The
statute was silent, though, on the criteria by which "adequacy" or
"effectiveness" was to be measured.
The constitutionality of the preclusion of habeas corpus
quickly came before the courts. Although the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits explicitly upheld § 2255 against constitutional
challenge, 27 the Ninth Circuit, in a controversial and divided
opinion, disagreed.28
At the heart of the complicated series of five opinions from the
three judges in the Ninth Circuit was the argument that § 2255
23. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 210-19 & nn.13-14, 17-19, 23, 25
(summarizing the evolution of what became § 2255).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 218.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2000).
27. See Barrett v. Hunter, 180 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1950); Martin v.
Hiatt, 174 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1949).
28. See Hayman v. United States, 187 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1950), vacated,
342 U.S. 205 (1951).
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was not in fact an adequate alternative to habeas corpus in the
case before the court (an appeal of the denial of a § 2255 motion).2 9
On the majority's view, the district court correctly denied
Hayman's § 2255 motion because, inter alia, it lacked the
authority to produce Hayman as a witness. But such a denial
would prejudice (if not formally preclude) his ability to challenge
the constitutionality of his conviction via habeas corpus. Thus,
because the § 2255 remedy was inadequate, and because habeas
would not effectively be available, the court (eventually) concluded
that § 2255 was unconstitutional.3 °
On certiorari, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated the
Ninth Circuit's decision. 3 1 Conceding that "respondent's motion
states grounds to support a collateral attack on his sentence,"
32
the Court read § 2255 as not precluding resort to habeas corpus in
such a case. After exhaustively recounting the background to §
2255, Chief Justice Vinson noted how:
29. The defendant, Herman Hayman, was convicted on six counts and
sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment by the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. He was subsequently imprisoned in the
federal prison at McNeil Island, Washington. See id. 457.
30. All three members of the panel filed opinions with respect to the
initial decision: Chief Judge Denman wrote for the court, and held that the
§ 2255 remedy was inadequate on the ground that the defendant was unable
to be a witness at his § 2255 hearing, which prejudiced his ability to assert
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See id. at 457-66.
Judge Stephens concurred in the result, but went further, reading the § 2255
hearing as having preclusive effect in any subsequent habeas petition, even
if-as in the case sub judice-the § 2255 remedy was "inadequate" or
"ineffective." Thus, Judge Stephens concluded that the statute was an
unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus. See id. at 466-68 (Stephens, J.,
concurring in the result). Finally, Judge Pope dissented, arguing that, as
Hayman had not yet attempted to file a federal habeas petition, resolution of
the constitutional question was premature. Moreover, Judge Pope disagreed
with Chief Judge Denman that the § 2255 remedy was inadequate. See id. at
468-71 (Pope, J., dissenting).
On rehearing, Chief Judge Denman came around to Judge Stephens's
position, and concluded that § 2255 was unconstitutional. See id. at 471-74
(Denman, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehearing). Judge Pope reiterated
his dissent. See id. at 474-75 (Pope, J., dissenting).
31. Hayman v. United States, 342 U.S. 205, 224 (1951). Technically, the
vote in support of Chief Justice Vinson's opinion was 6-0. Justices Black and
Douglas concurred in the result only (without explaining why), see id., and
Justice Minton did not participate. See id.
32. Id. at 210.
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[§ 2255] was passed at the instance of the Judicial
Conference to meet practical difficulties that had arisen
in administering the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do
we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners' rights of
collateral attack upon their convictions. On the contrary,
the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the
same rights in another and more convenient forum.
3 3
With that admonition in mind, the Court turned to the merits
of the Ninth Circuit's analysis. Disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit
that the defendant would not have been able to appear before the
sentencing court,3 4 the Supreme Court concluded that the district
court "did not proceed in conformity with Section 2255 when it
made findings on controverted issues of fact relating to
[Hayman's] own knowledge without notice to [him] and without
his being present. 3 5  In other words, the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion that the § 2255 remedy was inadequate in Hayman's
case was correct, but only because the district court had
misconstrued the scope of its authority under that section-not, as
the Ninth Circuit had concluded, because the district court lacked
the requisite authority. There was no need for the Ninth Circuit to
decide that § 2255 was therefore unconstitutional; it needed only
to have remanded the proceedings back to the lower court:
Nothing has been shown to warrant our holding at this
stage of the proceeding that the Section 2255 procedure
will be "inadequate or ineffective" if respondent is present
for a hearing in the District Court on remand of this case.
In a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be
'inadequate or ineffective'," the Section provides that the
habeas corpus remedy shall remain open to afford the
necessary hearing. Under such circumstances, we do not
reach constitutional questions. This Court will not pass
upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress where the
33. Id. at 219.
34. See id. at 220-21, 221 n.33 (noting the sentencing court's authority
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651).
35. Hayman, 342 U.S. at 220.
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question is properly presented unless such adjudication is
unavoidable, much less anticipate constitutional
questions.
3 6
Hayman thereby endorsed a broad reading of the scope of
review that sentencing courts could undertake pursuant to § 2255,
while reiterating that habeas would be available where the § 2255
proceedings were inadequate or ineffective. The Supreme Court
did nothing to clarify what "inadequate" or "ineffective" might
mean, but its broad construction of the sentencing court's
authority in entertaining § 2255 motions made that issue much
less likely to arise. 3
7
B. Swain v. Pressley and the D.C. Courts
A quarter-century after Hayman, the Court again confronted
the question of whether Congress could provide a substitute
remedy for habeas corpus in the context of section 23-110(g) of the
District of Columbia Code, a provision expressly modeled on 28
U.S.C. § 2255.38
Section 23-110(g) was codified as part of the massive
reorganization of the District of Columbia judicial system in
1970.39 Prior to 1970, the District of Columbia had what was
effectively a unitary court system,40 pursuant to which the courts
of the District of Columbia exercised both local and federal
36. Id. at 223 (footnotes omitted).
37. Indeed, the Court would subsequently characterize Hayman as
"avoid[ing] the constitutional question by holding that § 2255 was as broad as
habeas corpus." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 13 (1963).
38. See Palmore v. Superior Court of D.C., 515 F.2d 1294, 1306 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (en banc).
39. See generally D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. For cogent summaries, see JEFFREY
BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE
COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 233-35 (2001); Susan Low
Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the
Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 561-63 (2002);
John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical
View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 387-89 (2006).
40. Technically, there were purely "local" courts in the District of
Columbia prior to 1970, but they were courts of extremely limited subject-
matter jurisdiction, and appeals could be taken from their decisions to the
quasi-federal courts.
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jurisdiction. 4 ' Indeed, it was because of the unique "hybrid"
nature of the D.C. courts' jurisdiction that, from 1837 to 1962,
those courts were the only tribunals in the country with the power
to entertain petitions for writs of mandamus against federal
officials.
4 2
As part of a package of "home rule" measures (or, according to
some, to curb the influence of the then-left-leaning D.C. Circuit
over criminal law and criminal procedure), Congress bifurcated
the courts into distinctly local and distinctly federal systems, and
apportioned jurisdiction accordingly. 43 Along with the criminal
41. See generally Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 39; Roberts, supra note
39.
42. In 1813, the Supreme Court held that the lower federal courts
lacked the power to issue such common-law writs. See McIntire v. Wood, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813). Eight years later, the Court held that the state
courts lacked the power to provide such relief against federal officials. See
VcClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821). The clever solution,
initially theorized by D.C. Circuit Chief Judge William Cranch, was that,
because the D.C. district court was a federal court that could also exercise
local jurisdiction, it alone had the power to issue writs of mandamus against
federal officers. See United States ex rel. Stokes v. Kendall, 5 D.C. (5 Cranch)
163 (1837), affd, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). See generally Roberts, supra
note 39, at 380-82 (summarizing the background to the Kendall case).
Finally, in 1962, Congress enacted the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361, which confers jurisdiction on all federal district courts to entertain
petitions for writs of mandamus against federal officers.
One point that bears mentioning, and that I have never seen discussed
before, is whether the D.C. courts, a fortiori, would also have retained
common-law habeas jurisdiction for federal prisoners during this same time
period. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), only disavowed
common-law habeas corpus in the Article III courts, and Tarble's Case, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), only disavowed habeas for federal prisoners in
state courts. Although this is a fun academic question, the 1970
reorganization act appears to have closed this loophole and vitiated any
potential contemporary significance. See D.C. Court Reform and Criminal
Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. at 560 (codified at D.C.
CODE § 16-1901(b)) ("Petitions for writs directed to Federal officers and
employees shall be filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia."). For more on this curious historical footnote, see Stephen I.
Vladeck, The Riddle of the One-Way Ratchet: Habeas Corpus and the District
of Columbia, 11 GREEN BAG 2d (forthcoming 2008).
43. On the partisan motives behind the bifurcation, see Bloch &
Ginsburg, supra note 39, at 562 n.61; Patricia M. Wald, Ghosts of Judges
Past, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 675, 680-81 (1994). See also Patricia M. Wald,
The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV.
507, 509 (1988) (noting that "it is no secret that a major motivation for [the
2008]
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jurisdiction allocated to the new D.C. local courts (and taken away
from the D.C. federal district court), Congress provided for a post-
conviction remedy mirroring that provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
and one that otherwise appeared to preclude post-conviction
habeas corpus in the federal courts:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion
pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it
appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion
for relief under this section or that the Superior Court
has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of detention. 44
Unlike in Hayman, however, the post-conviction remedy
under D.C. law was a motion before local D.C. judges-Article I
judges not subject to Article III's salary and tenure protections. 45
Pressley therefore raised the issue-not considered in Hayman-of
whether a post-conviction remedy could be an "adequate" and
"effective" substitute for habeas corpus if it did not include
consideration by an Article III judge.
Interestingly, that issue was essentially sidestepped by the
D.C. Circuit, which held in Palmore v. Superior Court of the
District of Columbia that section 23-110(g) did not preclude the
district court's exercise of habeas jurisdiction, but only interposed
a requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies prior to seeking
Act] was the Nixon Administration's fierce opposition" to various decisions by
liberal D.C. Circuit judges).
44. D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) (1970). There is little legislative history that
explains why Congress would be concerned about remedying the same
problem § 2255 was supposed to address. After all, a post-conviction remedy
in the D.C. district court, as opposed to the D.C. Superior Court, would
hardly raise comparable logistical difficulties. That being said, if part of the
purpose for the reorganization of the D.C. courts was to undermine the D.C.
Circuit's role in shaping constitutional criminal procedure, it would have
made little sense to allow that court to accomplish indirectly (by hearing
habeas appeals of defendants convicted in the local D.C. courts) what the
statute clearly precluded it from doing directly.
45. See generally Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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federal habeas relief.4 6 Noting that "the district court construed a
statute which created a statutory remedy for post-conviction relief
in the new court system as eliminating by implication a remedy
which the inferior article III courts and the Supreme Court have
exercised for two hundred years,"4 7 the en banc court found
insufficient indication that Congress meant to force such a
potentially significant constitutional issue.48 Instead, as Judge
Tamm wrote for the court, "we find that Congress never intended
to, nor does section 110 actually, affect the district court's
jurisdiction to entertain post-conviction habeas petitions from
local prisoners. Instead, we hold that section 110(g) is an
exhaustion of remedies statute, requiring initial submission of
claims to the local courts . .. 49
The same day, the en banc D.C. Circuit applied Palmore to
the habeas petition of Jasper Pressley. Pressley was convicted in
April 1971 by the D.C. Superior Court of grand larceny and
larceny from the government. He was sentenced to concurrent
prison sentences to run between twenty and ninety-six months,
and was unsuccessful in two motions under section 23-110(g) for
post-conviction relief.50 After an interlocutory back-and-forth with
the D.C. Circuit, the district court denied Pressley's habeas
petition on the ground that "it appeared that appellant had not
adequately exhausted his remedies in the local court system."51
The en banc D.C. Circuit reversed. Relying on Palmore, the
court of appeals held that:
[T]he local courts fully considered the constitutional
claims on the merits. Thus, the local courts "had a full
opportunity to determine the federal constitutional issues
before resort was made to a federal forum, and the
policies served by the exhaustion requirement would not
be furthered by requiring submission of the claims to the
46. 515 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane).
47. Id. at 1307.
48. See id. at 1308-13.
49. Id. at 1313.
50. See Pressley v. Swain, 515 F.2d 1290, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc) (summarizing the background).
51. Id. at 1292.
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(local) courts."52
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Pressley and
Palmore and consolidated the cases for argument,53 only to
subsequently vacate and remand Palmore at the Solicitor
General's request (in light of the Court's intervening decision in
Stone v. Powell).54 Thus, Pressley became the vehicle for resolving
the meaning-and constitutionality-of section 23-110(g).
On certiorari, the Court emphatically rejected the D.C.
Circuit's conclusion in Palmore that section 23-110(g) was merely
an exhaustion requirement. First, the majority noted that the
statute expressly covers the exhaustion of local remedies, and
provides that habeas corpus should not be available unless the
local remedy was "inadequate" or "ineffective." 55 Second, as
Justice Stevens observed, section 23-110(g) was patterned
squarely on 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was meant to preclude
habeas corpus, and not just interpose an exhaustion
requirement.56
Thus, unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court was
squarely faced with the constitutional question of whether section
23-110(g), in divesting Pressley of the ability to pursue habeas
corpus proceedings in the district court, violated the Suspension
Clause. Justice Stevens made fairly quick work of this issue:
We are persuaded that the final clause in § 23-110(g)
avoids any serious question about the constitutionality of
the statute. That clause allows the District Court to
entertain a habeas corpus application if it "appears that
the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of [the applicant's] detention." Thus, the only
constitutional question presented is whether the
substitution of a new collateral remedy which is both
adequate and effective should be regarded as a
suspension of the Great Writ within the meaning of the
52. Id. at 1293 (quoting Francisco v. Gathright, 419 U.S. 59, 63 (1974)).
53. Super. Ct. of D.C. v. Palmore, 424 U.S. 907 (1976) (mem.).
54. See Super. Ct. of D.C. v. Palmore, 429 U.S. 915 (1976) (mem.) (citing
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)); see also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S.
372, 376 n.7 (1977) (summarizing the facts).
55. See Pressley, 430 U.S. at 377.
56. See id. at 377-78.
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Constitution. 57
That is to say, because section 23-110(g) precluded habeas
unless the post-conviction remedy was "inadequate" and
"ineffective," the negative implication was that habeas would be
available unless the post-conviction remedy was adequate and
effective to test the legality of the defendant's detention. And so,
the only question was whether such a substitute for habeas-i.e.,
one that was both adequate and effective in challenging the
legality of the defendant's detention-violated the Suspension
Clause. That question, according to Justice Stevens, had been
answered in Hayman: "The Court implicitly held in Hayman, as
we hold in this case, that the substitution of a collateral remedy
which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a
person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus." 58 Thus, in one sentence, the Court in Pressley
enunciated what appeared to be a constitutional rule.
Three points are worth flagging: First, Hayman, as we saw
above, held no such thing. Instead, the Court in Hayman
expressly avoided the question whether § 2255 was
constitutional, 59 holding that the district court had simply
misconstrued the scope of its authority to fashion post-conviction
relief.60
Second, there is an element of Justice Stevens's analysis that
seems tautological: under section 23-110(g), a defendant was only
precluded from pursuing a federal habeas petition if his motion for
local post-conviction relief was both "adequate" and "effective" in
testing the legality of his detention. Thus, as a statutory matter, a
defendant was entitled either to habeas, or to an adequate and
57. Id. at 381 (alteration in original).
58. Id.
59. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952) ("Under
such circumstances, we do not reach constitutional questions. This Court will
not pass upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress where the question
is properly presented unless such adjudication is unavoidable, much less
anticipate constitutional questions.") (footnote omitted).
60. See id. at 223-24 ("We conclude that the District Court erred in
determining the factual issues raised by respondent's motion under Section
2255 without notice to respondent and without his presence. We hold that the
required hearing can be afforded respondent under the procedure established
in Section 2255.").
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effective substitute. So the only constitutional question the
Pressley Court decided was whether Congress can replace habeas
corpus with adequate and effective substitutes (which the Court
answered in the affirmative). The Court said nothing at all about
whether the replacement of habeas corpus with an inadequate or
ineffective substitute would necessarily violate the Suspension
Clause; under section 23-110(g), just as under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
that question simply could not ever arise.
Finally, although the requirement that the substitute remedy
be "adequate" and "effective" came from the D.C. Code, as opposed
to the Suspension Clause, the Court went on reach the question of
D.C. law-whether, in Pressley's case, the local post-conviction
remedy was in fact an "adequate" and "effective" substitute.
Rejecting the argument that Article I judges, as a general matter,
could not be trusted to decide federal constitutional questions,
6 1
the Court noted that there were no specific allegations of
insufficiency in Pressley itself. Thus:
[W]e have no occasion to consider what kind of showing
would be required to demonstrate that the § 23-110
remedy is inadequate or ineffective in a particular case,
or whether the character of the judge's tenure might be
relevant to such a showing in a case presenting issues of
extraordinary public concern. 62
In short, then, Pressley held that the mere presence of an
Article I judge, by itself, was not enough to render the remedy
provided by section 23-110(g) "inadequate" or "ineffective." As
such, Pressley was therefore not entitled to pursue habeas relief in
the federal district court.63 The Court said nothing about what
61. See Pressley, 430 U.S. at 382-83 (citing Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389, 410-22 (1973)). Justice Stevens also noted that defendants in
Pressley's position still had two opportunities for Article III review-to the
Supreme Court on direct appeal from his conviction, and to the Court again
on appeal of the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief under section
23-110(g). See id. at 382 n.16.
62. Id. at 383 n.20.
63. Concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice Burger-joined by
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist-would have upheld section 23-110(g) on
the ground that the Constitution confers no right to habeas corpus to
collaterally attack a criminal conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction.
See id. at 384-86 (Burger, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
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would constitute an "inadequate" or "ineffective" substitute, and it
also did not say that such a substitute would necessarily violate
the Suspension Clause; at the heart of the decision was the
statutory safety valve, i.e., that section 23-110(g) expressly
reserved access to habeas corpus if the post-conviction remedy
proved "inadequate" or "ineffective."
In that regard, the majority opinion in Pressley is curiously
cursory, for one might assume that those two points are related-
that a court's analysis of whether a particular remedy is an
"adequate" substitute for habeas corpus might depend to some
degree on whether a negative holding would raise a serious
constitutional question. Because of the language of section 23-
110(g), however, Pressley did not need to address any of these
weighty questions.
III. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES AFTER PRESSLEY
For two decades, Swain v. Pressley languished in obscurity.
Congress made no new attempts to provide a substitute remedy
for habeas corpus, and the significance (or lack thereof) of the
Court's discussion of the limitations on such legislation went
effectively unnoticed in both the courts and the academy. Instead,
the potential significance of Swain v. Pressley did not become
apparent until the enactment of a series of statutes constraining
the habeas jurisdiction of the federal courts. First, of course, was
the enactment of "AEDPA",64 which dramatically reworked the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal courts both in cases
where prisoners sought to collaterally attack their state-court
convictions and in immigration cases. Also of significance is the
REAL ID Act of 2005,65 which reapportioned jurisdiction between
the Courts of Appeals (on direct review) and habeas proceedings in
the district courts. After surveying the role Swain v. Pressley
played in these sets of cases, Part III turns to the other major area
where Swain v. Pressley has been invoked-the detention of non-
citizens as "enemy combatants" as part of the "war on terrorism,"
judgment).
64. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996)(codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 22, 28, 40, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).
65. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302-23 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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and Congress's repeated attempts to constrain their access to the
federal courts.
A. Felker: Alternative Remedies and Habeas Appeals
One of the major changes wrought by AEDPA was the
creation of a "gatekeeper" system for "second or successive" federal
habeas petitions filed by state prisoners seeking to collaterally
attack their conviction. 66 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), as added
by AEDPA, a petitioner seeking to file a second or successive
habeas petition challenging a state-court conviction must first
obtain permission from the relevant Court of Appeals. 67 If the
court grants permission, the petitioner may proceed to file his
petition in the district court.68 If the court denies permission, the
statute expressly divests the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to
review that denial either as an appeal or via a writ of certiorari.69
In Felker v. Turpin,70 the Court considered whether AEDPA was
unconstitutional in so precluding the Court's review.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist relied on the
fact that Congress had not divested all of the Supreme Court's
possible jurisdiction. Instead, Rehnquist invoked the Court's so-
called "original" habeas jurisdiction, which AEDPA had left
untouched:
Although § 2244(b)(3)(E) precludes us from reviewing, by
appeal or petition for certiorari, a judgment on an
application for leave to file a second habeas petition in
district court, it makes no mention of our authority to
hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this
Court. As we declined to find a repeal of § 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 as applied to this Court by
implication [in Ex parte Yerger 71], we decline to find a
similar repeal of § 2241 of Title 28-its descendant-by
66. See generally Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance
Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1556-
62 (2000) (discussing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996)).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2001).
68. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
69. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
70. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
71. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
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implication now.
72
Thus, because Felker could have sought habeas relief directly
in the Supreme Court once his application was denied, the Court
concluded that AEDPA's gatekeeping provision did not violate the
Exceptions Clause of Article III.
73
One might also characterize such a holding in Pressley's
terms-i.e., that an "original" habeas petition in the Supreme
Court was an adequate and effective substitute for an appeal of
the denial of a habeas petition by the circuit court. As part of that
implicit conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the
substantive restrictions contained within AEDPA would not apply
to the Supreme Court's review of an original habeas petition
(suggesting that there might be a problem if they did).74 Finally,
the Court also rejected Felker's argument that AEDPA's
gatekeeping provision violated the Suspension Clause, concluding
that Congress was acting well within its authority in codifying
necessary responses to the "abuse of the writ" by second and
successive petitioners.
75
Although the decision was unanimous, Justice Souter-joined
by Justices Stevens and Breyer-wrote separately "only to add
that if it should later turn out that statutory avenues other than
certiorari for reviewing a gatekeeping determination were closed,
the question whether the statute exceeded Congress's Exceptions
Clause power would be open."76 In other words, from Justice
Souter's perspective, if the alternative remedies turned out to be
ineffective, the constitutional question avoided in Felker would be
squarely presented.7 7
72. Felker, 518 U.S. at 661 (citations omitted).
73. See id. at 662-63.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 663-64. The majority then considered-and quickly
rejected-whether Felker would be entitled to original habeas relief. See id.
at 664-65.
76. Id. at 667 (Souter, J., concurring).
77. Indeed, though it might seem perverse to rely on the availability of a
remedy (an "original" habeas petition) that has not been successfully invoked
in over eighty years, the Supreme Court has shown repeated awareness of
the possibility of such relief as a last resort. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 547
U.S. 1062, 1063 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari);
see also Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478 (2007) (Stevens and
Kennedy, JJ., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting the potential
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B. The REAL ID Act of 2005: Alternative Remedies and
Immigration Law
The harder questions raised by AEDPA vis-A-vis habeas
corpus went to its constriction of the substantive grounds for relief
in petitions filed by state prisoners, 78 and its attempted cabining
of the federal courts' habeas jurisdiction in immigration cases. 79
In INS v. St. Cyr,80 the Supreme Court-following the lead of
virtually all of the circuits-adopted a somewhat counter-textual
interpretation of various provisions in AEDPA and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA)81 in holding that neither statute actually precluded
access to habeas corpus.8 2 Instead, the Court held that only the
clearest statement of congressional intent would compel reaching
the serious constitutional questions that would arise if AEDPA
and IIRIRA precluded habeas review.8 3
Citing Swain v. Pressley, the majority in St. Cyr recognized
Congress's power to displace habeas by providing adequate
alternative remedies in the courts of appeals. 8 4 Nevertheless, the
Court's holding suggested that the relevant provisions of AEDPA
and IIRIRA instead cabined the jurisdiction of the courts of
availability of original relief "[i]f petitioners later seek to establish that the
Government has unreasonably delayed proceedings under the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, or some other and ongoing injury" (citation omitted)).
78. See generally Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 665-70 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Noonan, J., concurring) (summarizing the problematic nature of post-
AEDPA review).
79. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension
Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555 (2002)
(discussing the background to St. Cyr and the larger constitutional issues).
80. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
81. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 20, 22, 28, 32, 42, 48, and 50 U.S.C.).
82. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299-305.
83. See, e.g., id. at 301 n.13 ("The fact that this Court would be required
to answer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in
and of itself a reason to avoid answering the constitutional questions that
would be raised by concluding that review was barred entirely."). See also id.
at 326-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority's rationale as "a
superclear statement, 'magic words' requirement").
84. See id. at 314 n.38 (majority opinion) ("Congress could, without
raising any constitutional questions, provide an adequate substitute through
the courts of appeals.").
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appeals to entertain petitions for review, shifting even more
immigration claims into the habeas jurisdiction of the district
courts (especially where "criminal aliens" were concerned). 85 Thus,
in the ensuing years, there was mounting confusion over which
claims had to be pressed on direct review from the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), and which claims could only be
brought via habeas, a distinction that often turned on the very
facts in dispute in individual cases.
86
Congress eventually responded through the REAL ID Act of
2005, 8 7 the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of which attempted to
reverse the direction of immigration litigation. 88 Thus, the Act
significantly expands the scope of the Courts of Appeals'
jurisdiction over petitions for review, while otherwise purporting
to preclude habeas petitions in any case where an immigrant
seeks to challenge a final order of removal.8 9 As new 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(D) provides:
Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other
provision of this Act (other than this section) which limits
or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of
law raised upon a petition for review filed with an
appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this
section.
90
In other words, the REAL ID Act of 2005 attempts to preclude
the habeas review relied upon in St. Cyr, substituting for it the
administrative review provided by the Courts of Appeals. 91 As
85. Indeed, the same day as St. Cyr, the Court rejected the argument
that the courts of appeals could hear otherwise precluded claims as an
alternative to habeas. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001). See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the
REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 135 (2006).
86. See, e.g., Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 877-79 (9th Cir.
2003) (citing Sareang Ye v. INS, 214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)).
87. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302-23 (2005).
88. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005).
89. See Neuman, supra note 85, at 136-41.
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (which
provides that such review is exclusive).
91. See, e.g., Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005)
("These modifications effectively limit all aliens to one bite of the apple with
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Professor Neuman cogently asks:
Will direct review in the courts of appeals, as refrained by
the REAL ID Act, provide an adequate and effective
substitute for the writ of habeas corpus sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the Suspension Clause? The
answer depends on how the statutory structure will be
interpreted, and on what the Suspension Clause
requires.
92
Thus, Professor Neuman highlighted as major areas of
concern "the effect of the thirty-day filing period in limiting the
availability of review of removal orders, the fact-finding capacity
of the courts of appeals, and the availability of review for
questions that arise after a removal order has been issued. 9 3
Professor Neuman was writing shortly after the REAL ID Act
was enacted, and subsequent developments in the courts have not
added too much to his cogent analysis. For the most part, the
courts of appeals have upheld the REAL ID Act against
constitutional challenge, focusing in almost every case on the
REAL ID Act's expansion of the courts' jurisdiction to review the
administrative decision on direct appeal. 94 Even when the
adequacy of the remedy has been open to some question, courts
have uniformly upheld the congressional displacement of habeas
corpus. 9 5 In Part IV, I will return to the implications of some of
these cases.
regard to challenging an order of removal, in an effort to streamline what the
Congress saw as uncertain and piecemeal review of orders of removal, divided
between the district courts (habeas corpus) and the courts of appeals
(petitions for review)."). The Conference Report for the statute even relies
upon Swain v. Pressley. See H.R. REP. No. 109-72, at 175 (2005), 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 300.
92. Neuman, supra note 85, at 142.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2007); Jean-Pierre v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2007); Kolkevich v. Att'y Gen., 501
F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2007); Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2007); De Ping Wang v. D.H.S., 484 F.3d 615 (2d Cir. 2007); Ramadan v.
Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007); Mohamed v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 522
(8th Cir. 2007).
95. Indeed, two decisions have expressly invoked Swain v. Pressley. See
Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. D.O.J., 471 F.3d 315, 326 (2d Cir. 2006); Enwonwu v.
Gonzales, 438 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2006).
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Ultimately, though, the REAL ID Act was really just a
preview for the far more serious battle that was to come-the
question of providing a substitute remedy for individuals detained
in conjunction with the war on terrorism.
C. Hamdan: Alternative Remedies and Guantdnamo, Part I
The scope of federal habeas jurisdiction has been at the heart
of the United States' detention of non-citizen "enemy combatants"
at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba, since the first detainees were
transferred there early in 2002.96 Although the lower courts
divided over whether the habeas statute extended to petitions
filed by the Guant~namo detainees, 97 the Supreme Court, in
Rasul v. Bush, held that it did. 98 Shortly after the Rasul decision,
and (arguably) motivated by the Court's same-day decision in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,99 the government established "Combatant
Status Review Tribunals" (CSRTs) to provide administrative
review of the detainees' claims that they were not "enemy
combatants" in the first place. 100
But it was not until December 2005, after the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Hamdan v. Rumsfeldl'-which challenged
the legality of the military tribunals established pursuant to
President Bush's November 13, 2001 Military Order102-that
Congress attempted to cast the CSRTs as an "alternative" to
96. For an overview, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer,
Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120
HARv. L. REV. 2029 (2007).
97. Compare Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting
jurisdiction), and Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(same), with Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir. 2003) (sustaining
jurisdiction).
98. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
99. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality).
100. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443,
450-51 (D.D.C. 2005).
101. For the grant, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 546 U.S. 1002 (2005)
(mem.). The district court had struck down the commissions, only to be
reversed by the D.C. Circuit. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152
(D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
102. Military Order of November 13, 2001-Detention, Treatment, and
Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 57,
833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
2008]
434 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:411
habeas corpus. Thus, in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,103
Congress attempted to restrict all judicial review of the detainees'
claims to two avenues: an appeal to the D.C. Circuit from the
CSRT,10 4 and, for certain detainees convicted by military
commission, an appeal to the D.C. Circuit from the final judgment
of conviction. 
10 5
Critically, the DTA provided that such review would be
exclusive. The statute otherwise purported to oust the habeas
jurisdiction of the federal courts-including the Supreme Court:
Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider... an application for
a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba... 106
In Hamdan, the majority sidestepped all questions as to the
103. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44 (2005).
104. Under the DTA, the D.C. Circuit could only review:
(i) whether the status determination of the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal with regard to such alien was consistent with the
standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including the requirement that
the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of
the evidence and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the
Government's evidence); and (ii) to the extent the Constitution and
laws of the United States are applicable, whether the use of such
standards and procedures to make the determination is consistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C), 119 Stat. at 2742.
105. Again, the DTA limited the D.C. Circuit's review to:
(i) whether the final decision was consistent with the standards and
procedures specified in [Military Commission Order No. 1, dated
August 31, 20051; and (ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of
the United States are applicable, whether the use of such standards
and procedures to reach the final decision is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
Id. § 1005(e)(3)(D), 119 Stat. at 2743. Curiously, such appeals were only as of
right for defendants convicted and sentenced to death or to imprisonment for
10 years or more. For defendants receiving lesser sentences, the statute
provided that the appeal "shall be at the discretion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." Id. § 1005(e)(3)(B)(ii), 119
Stat. at 2743.
106. DTA § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 2742.
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constitutionality of the DTA's exclusive review scheme, holding
that the statutory language was insufficiently clear concerning
whether the jurisdiction-stripping provision should apply to
pending cases (including Hamdan and most of the other petitions
brought by the Guantdnamo detainees). 10 7 Thus, the adequacy of
DTA review was irrelevant; on the Hamdan Court's view, the DTA
did not preclude access to habeas corpus in all cases pending on
the date of the statute's enactment.
Although the majority therefore did not reach the Swain v.
Pressley question, Justice Scalia-who concluded that the DTA's
applicability to pending cases was beyond question-did. In his
view, "even if petitioner were fully protected by the [Suspension]
Clause, the DTA would create no suspension problem."'10 8 In
Justice Scalia's view:
[T]he "standards and procedures specified in" Order No. 1
include every aspect of the military commissions,
including the fact of their existence and every respect in
which they differ from courts-martial. Petitioner's claims
that the President lacks legal authority to try him before
a military commission constitute claims that "the use of
such standards and procedures," as specified in Order No.
1, is "[in]consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." The D.C. Circuit thus retains jurisdiction
to consider these claims on postdecision review ... Thus,
the DTA merely defers our jurisdiction to consider
petitioner's claims; it does not eliminate that jurisdiction.
It constitutes neither an "inadequate" nor an "ineffective"
substitute for petitioner's pending habeas application.
10 9
Whether Justice Scalia was correct or not, the DTA's lack of
clarity ensured that the issue would be left for another day. As it
turned out, that day came rather quickly.
107. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762-69 (2006).
108. Id. at 2818 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2818-19 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
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D. Boumediene and Bismullah: Alternative Remedies and
Guantdnamo, Part II
In response to Hamdan, Congress enacted the MCA."10 In
addition to providing statutory authority for trials by military
commission and creating both trial-level courts and the Court of
Military Commission Review (CMCR)," 1 the MCA, in stronger
statutory language, attempted to make the CSRT review scheme
exclusive. Thus, section 7 of the MCA provides that:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States
who has been determined by the United States to have
been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination. 1 12
Although the MCA tweaks the appellate review of military
commissions in several significant ways,113 it effectively leaves
the DTA procedure intact with respect to judicial review of CSRT
decisions. Thus, under the DTA/MCA, individuals determined to
be "enemy combatants" by CSRTs, but not subject to trial by
military commission, have only one appeal to the D.C. Circuit to
test the legality of their detention. 114
110. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
111. See id. § 3, 120 Stat. at 2621 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950(f)).
112. Id. § 7(a), 120 Stat at 2635 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)). The
statute further provides that, except as provided by the DTA:
no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider
any other action against the United States or its agents relating to
any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions
of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United
States and has been determined by the United States to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2).
113. See id. § 9, 120 Stat. at 2636-37. Although these amendments
appear to be technical, they solve several potential problems with the DTA's
review provisions, including the DTA's limitation to challenges to the "August
31, 2005" military commission order, its provision for discretionary appeals
for detainees receiving sentences of less than ten years, and its limitation on
applicability to those individuals detained at Guantdnamo Bay.
114. One hard question is whether this provision applies to Ali Saleh
Kahlah A1-Marri, the one non-citizen held as an "enemy combatant" within
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Understandably, much of the focus on the MCA has been on
the constitutionality of its foreclosure of habeas jurisdiction, which
the D.C. Circuit addressed (and upheld) in Boumediene v. Bush.115
As Judge Randolph wrote for the majority, the Suspension Clause
does not protect non-citizens outside the territorial United States,
and so the MCA could not raise a constitutional question, even if
the substitute remedy it provided were inadequate. 116 Judge
Rogers dissented as to the reach of the Suspension Clause, 117 and
also concluded that the DTA/MCA remedy was constitutionally
inadequate. 118 In her words:
Even if the CSRT protocol were capable of assessing
whether a detainee was unlawfully held and entitled to
be released, it is not an adequate substitute for the
habeas writ because this remedy is not guaranteed. Upon
concluding that detention is unjustified, a habeas court
"can only direct [the prisoner] to be discharged." But
neither the DTA nor the MCA require this, and a recent
report studying CSRT records shows that when at least
three detainees were found by CSRTs not to be enemy
combatants, they were subjected to a second, and in one
case a third, CSRT proceeding until they were finally
found to be properly classified as enemy combatants. 119
As Judge Rogers's dissent underscores, the question whether
the MCA violates the Suspension Clause (to the extent it
applies)120 simply cannot be decoupled from questions as to the
scope of review under the DTA/MCA, which a different panel of
the D.C. Circuit has considered in a series of opinions in
the territorial United States. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that it did not, Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160
(4th Cir. 2007), but that decision has since been vacated and is pending
rehearing en banc.
115. 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).
116. See id. at 988-92.
117. See id. at 995-1004 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 1004-07.
119. Id. at 1006 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
120. On why the Boumediene majority's argument that the Suspension
Clause simply does not "apply" to Guant~namo is unconvincing, see Vladeck,
supra note 2.
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Bismullah v. Gates.12
1
In Bismullah "I," the first appeal from a CSRT entertained by
the D.C. Circuit, the court rejected the government's argument
that its review should be limited to the record produced by the
CSRT. Thus, as Chief Judge Ginsburg wrote for the panel:
[T]he record on review consists of all the information a
Tribunal is authorized to obtain and consider, pursuant
to the procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense,
hereinafter referred to as Government Information and
defined by the Secretary of the Navy as "such reasonably
available information in the possession of the U.S.
Government bearing on the issue of whether the detainee
meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy
combatant," which includes any information presented to
the Tribunal by the detainee or his Personal
Representative. 1
22
The court went on to issue a series of orders governing the
means by which that record should be disclosed to counsel for the
detainees. 123 The upside of the decision, though, was that review
of a CSRT appeal could include information outside the record.
The court then denied the government's petition for rehearing in
Bismullah "II," and a divided court denied rehearing en banc. Lest
there be any doubt about Bismullah's significance, consider the
Supreme Court's order granting certiorari in Boumediene: "As it
would be of material assistance to consult any decision in
Bismullah . . .currently pending in the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, supplemental
briefing will be scheduled upon issuance of any decision in those
cases."
' 124
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the adequacy of DTAJMCA
review as a substitute for habeas corpus is perhaps the most
important issue before the Court in Boumediene. But inasmuch as
the D.C. Circuit's focus has been on the scope of the factual record
121. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Bismullah v.
Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d
1291 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (mem.) (denying rehearing en banc).
122. See Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 180.
123. See id. at 189-91.
124. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007) (mem.).
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available for the court of appeals to review a CSRT decision, two
hard legal questions remain unanswered as of this writing:
First, does the DTA/MCA review encompass claims
challenging whether the detainee is subject to military detention
in the first place, let alone whether he is an "enemy combatant,"
as defined by applicable regulations (and, now, the MCA)? That is
to say, in challenging the procedures by which the CSRT arrives
at its determination that a detainee is an "enemy combatant,"
does the detainee have the ability to contest his amenability to
military detention (and military jurisdiction) in the first place?
Second, and separately, what is the significance of section 5 of
the MCA, which provides that "[no person may invoke the Geneva
Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas corpus or
other civil action or proceeding [against the United States or an
officer thereof] . .. as a source of rights in any court of the United
States or its States or territories"?125 If habeas corpus, as a
general matter, encompasses claims that detention is in violation
of a duly-enacted federal treaty,12 6 section 5 appears to preclude
review of one (important) ground by which the detention of some-
if not many--of the Guantdnamo detainees might be unlawful.
One answer might be that Congress has the power to override
(or at least "un-execute") treaties. 127 But if not, then the harder
125. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 5, 120
Stat. 2600, 2631.
126. See, e.g., Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887) (recognizing the power
to enforce treaties via the federal habeas statute); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)
(2008) (providing that habeas is available to prisoners "in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States" (emphasis
added)). For an argument that habeas might therefore provide a cause of
action for the enforcement of "non-self-executing" treaties, see Stephen I.
Vladeck, Case Comment, Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Suspension
Clause After St. Cyr, 113 YALE L.J. 2007 (2004).
127. Such an argument might actually have more weight in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct 1346 (2008), which
appears to establish-for the first time-that "non-self-executing" treaties are
not binding federal law. See, e.g., id. at 1356-57 n.2. Even if the MCA was
intended to "un-execute" the Geneva Conventions, the Supreme Court has
traditionally required a clear statement from Congress when it intends to so
provide. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S.
243, 252 (1984); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933). Whatever
else might be said about the MCA, it is hardly "clear" on this point. See
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Military Commissions Act, the Geneva
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question remains: whether the rule of Swain v. Pressley includes
the ability to press all possible claims that federal detention is
unlawful. Pressley itself, again, is of little help in providing any
answers.
IV. THE MYTH OF SWAIN V. PRESSLEY
Perhaps the most important characteristic of both Swain v.
Pressley and its predecessor, United States v. Hayman, is that the
statutes in question in each case had a habeas "safety-valve."
Thus, if the alternative remedy provided by § 2255 or D.C. Code
section 23-110(g) proved to be "inadequate" or "ineffective," the
statutes expressly contemplated the continuing availability of
habeas corpus to test the legality of detention. 128 Judges
interpreting whether, in particular cases, the remedy had proven
"adequate" or "effective" to test the legality of the petitioner's
confinement could therefore err on the side of caution, safe in the
knowledge that their decision had no constitutional implications,
and that habeas remained available in cases where the post-
conviction remedy was deemed insufficient.
The modern substitutes, in contrast, contain no such safety
valve. They create alternative remedies to habeas corpus, and
then provide that those remedies are exclusive. Thus, statutes
such as the REAL ID Act, the DTA, and the MCA, put judges in
an incredibly difficult position, with enormous pressure to
conclude that the substitute remedy provided by the statute is
"adequate" and "effective," even when (as in Boumediene, perhaps)
there are considerable arguments to the contrary. Otherwise,
jurists considering such claims would be left to strike down the
Conventions, and the Courts: A Critical Guide, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 73, 76-92
(2007).
128. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008) ("An application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by
motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained . . . unless it also
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention."), with D.C. CODE § 23-110(g) ("An application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for
relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the
Superior Court or by any Federal or State court ... unless it also appears
that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.").
MYTH OF SWAIN V. PRESSLEY
statute as violating the Suspension Clause, something the
Supreme Court has never done. 1
29
As a result, in a number of cases arising under the REAL ID
Act, courts have already gone out of their way to conclude that the
restoration of direct review provided by the statute is an
"adequate" and "effective" substitute to habeas corpus, even when
the analysis seems somewhat counterintuitive. Thus, courts either
read into the statute the ability to consider claims that the statute
seems to preclude, or the court concludes that procedural
limitations on direct review do not actually serve to render such
review "inadequate" or "ineffective."
The "myth" of Swain v. Pressley, then, is that it provides a
meaningful test to apply to circumstances wherein Congress has
attempted to provide an alternative remedy to habeas corpus. At
most, it provides a useful example of how Congress might legislate
responsibly to do so. But where Congress provides that the
alternative remedy is exclusive, even where it might be
inadequate or ineffective, the precedents suggest that Swain v.
Pressley, coupled with the constitutional avoidance canon, actually
distorts the courts' analysis of the underlying issue.
Whatever the merits of the underlying claims in the
Guant~namo cases, one point seems clear: If the Suspension
Clause does "apply to" or otherwise protect the Guant~namo
detainees, the central question before the Supreme Court will be
whether the remedy provided by the DTAIMCA constitutes an
"adequate" and "effective" substitute for habeas corpus. As the
above discussion demonstrates, Swain v. Pressley holds that
Congress has the power to so provide, but does little to elaborate
upon what "adequate" means. Moreover, because of constitutional
avoidance, the Court would be under enormous pressure to
conclude that the remedy is adequate and effective, even if it has
to adopt a strained interpretation to reach such a result.
At the very least, Boumediene provides the Court with an
opportunity to shed light on questions that were avoided in
Hayman, and only cursorily addressed in Pressley. And if the last
129. The Court has shied away from even interpreting the Suspension
Clause. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001).
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decade is any indication, clarification of the limitations on
Congress's power to fashion alternative remedies to habeas corpus
will have ramifications far afield of Guantdnamo and the war on
terrorism.
Given the unquestioned importance of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the Supreme Court's repeated admonitions that "we
have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus
statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or
hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic
procedural requirements,"' 130 it is long-past time for greater clarity
in delineating the limits on Congress's power to displace the writ
with alternative remedies, lest that power become the means by
which Congress further "suffocate[s] the writ."
130. Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350 (1973).
